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PARTIES 
The appellant is Adrian Niculescu, represented by Mark A. Besendorfer. The 
Respondents, Chrysler Credit Corporation and Chrysler Motor Corporation, are represented by 
the P. Bryan Fishburn. 
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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This court has jurisdiction pursuant to U.C.A. 78-2A-2(3)(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A. Whether the lower court erred in granting summary judgment with respect to any 
claims dealing with negligent damage to Appellant's credit, dismissing those claims. The lower 
court ruled that the applicable standard was malice, rather than negligence, because that was the 
only standard under which the Appellant could recover at the time of the original filing of the 
lawsuit. Appellant argued that the actions of respondents in failing to correct the credit report, 
and their failure to comply with the settlement agreement, which occurred after the amendment of 
the law allowing claims for negligent damage, should be considered in light of the amended law 
and more liberal standard. The lower court's decision should be viewed for correctness and no 
deference should be given the trial court's determination as to the applicability of the rule. 
B. Whether the lower court erred in not imposing sanctions for delays and the refusal of 
the respondents to comply with discovery requests. The court refused to deem requests for 
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admission admitted when no timely response was filed to such requests. The lower court's 
decision should be viewed for correctness and no deference should be given the trial court's 
determination as to the applicability of the rule. 
C. Whether the lower court erred in finding that the Appellant failed to prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent's actions were intentional and malicious, and 
therefore actionable. 
D. Whether the court erred in not granting the appellant's motion for relief from judgment 
and not amending the findings and judgment. This issue is viewed against a standard of abuse of 
discretion. 
CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
1. 15U.S.C. 1681. 
2. Rule 36, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
The appellant purchased a new Chrysler van from Hinckley Chrysler on the 11th day of 
arch, 1987. He returned it to the dealership, prior to the first payment becoming due, claiming it 
was defective. He informed Chrysler Credit that he would not pay for the vehicle because of the 
problems. Chrysler Credit obtained the vehicle from the dealership, sold it, and claimed a 
deficiency, although no effort was made to collect the deficiency. The credit company listed the 
transaction, and reported it to all of the major credit reporting agencies, as a repossession. When 
the appellant, who had previously enjoyed a good credit report, next attempted to purchase 
another vehicle, he was denied financing because of the now negative credit report. 
The appellant filed suit against the dealership and Chrysler Motor Corporation in United 
States District Court for Utah, alleging breach of contract and breach of warranty. That matter 
was eventually settled out of court. The present action was filed against Chrysler Credit 
Corporation in 1989, alleging damage to the credit of the Appellant for the false and negative 
credit report under 15 U.S.C. 1681. Discovery ensued and various motions were heard. 
Respondent continually delayed the matter by failing to timely respond to discovery requests. 
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Eventually, in August of 1992 a settlement was reached and signed by the parties. The essence of 
the settlement was that the respondent agreed to pay a small amount of money to the appellant, 
and also agreed to notify all credit reporting agencies by way of a letter and explanation of the 
terms of the settlement and requesting they correct or delete the credit entry of repossession 
related to the transaction. 
When the appellant's efforts to obtain proof of compliance by the respondent were 
unsatisfactory, he filed a motion to have the settlement vacated and re-open the case. The 
respondent failed to respond, and the court granted the motion. Further discovery commenced, 
including paper discovery and depositions. Among the paper discovery were requests for 
admissions, which were not timely answered by the respondent. A motion to compel was granted 
and the answers were belatedly received, although they amounted to general denials based upon 
lack of information. A motion for further sanctions was filed and denied by the trial judge. 
A motion for summary judgment was filed by the respondent. Two of the causes of action 
were dismissed, and another was limited in scope, leaving one cause of action and part of another 
intact, essentially requiring that, in order to prevail at trial, appellant would have to prove that the 
credit report was false and that the error was intentional or malicious. 
The assigned trial judge, the late Anne Stirba, was gravely ill by the time the trial was held. 
Retired judge Douglas L. Cornaby was assigned to try the case, Judge Stirba having previously 
denied a motion to allow the matter to be tried by a jury. In spite of the bulk of the file and the 
many actions taken in the matter over the years, the judge had apparently only seen the file shortly 
before the trial date. Trial was held on the 12th and 13th of February, 2001. Five witnesses were 
called and some 30 exhibits were received. The court announced its findings and a proposed order 
was prepared. Objections to the order were filed and another judge, the Honorable Bruce Lubeck, 
who was now assigned to the cases of Judge Stirba, ruled on the objections, denying them and 
affirming the original form of the order. This appeal was taken from that order. The matter was 
filed in the Utah Supreme Court and then assigned to this court. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Mr. Adrian Niculescu testified that he had been born in Romania and had emigrated to this 
country to escape the conditions there and partake of what this country had to offer. He and his 
wife and children began to build a typical American life. He established his credit and was able to 
purchase a new 1983 Chevrolet Cavalier in 1983 for approximately $13,000, which he paid off on 
time in 1987. (T.R. p. 26). During this same time period he also bought on credit and paid off 
another vehicle for his wife, a Nissan. (T.R. p. 27). He had other credit accounts as well, including 
an account to finance the purchase of furniture. (T.R. p. 28). The respondent conceded that there 
was no evidence that the appellant had ever been turned down for credit before the purchase in 
issue here. (T.R. p. 14). 
The appellant, therefore, had exemplary credit on March 11, 1987, when he purchased a 
new 1987 van and financed the entire purchase price through Chrysler Credit Corporation. The 
contract of sale was introduce as Exhibit 16. The van was to be used to enable the Appellant to 
engage in the more lucrative ski and mountain resort fares, where he could transport more 
passengers and bulkier luggage, such as skis. (T.R. p. 32). It was financed through Chrysler 
Credit Corporation, with a total payoff, over the life of the contract, of approximately $24,000. 
The appellant started having problems with the van almost immediately. Besides problems with 
the sliding door that would not close and other minor matters, the vehicle had a serious oil leak. 
(T.R. p. 34, 35, Exhibit 17 and 18). However, when the van was not at the dealership being 
repaired, the appellant was using the van and it was working out as he had hoped, allowing him to 
bring in fares of $2000 in approximately three weeks. (T.R. p. 37). He had expenses for fuel and 
fees to the cab company during this same period to time, of approximately $360, leaving him a net 
earning of $1,640, or $2,186 per month. (T.R. p. 38). 
Mr. Niculescu took the van to be repaired numerous times. (T.R. p. 39). After the dealer 
either could not, or would not properly repair the van, the Appellant sent letters to the dealership 
and the manufacturer. When he received no response or appropriate action, he returned the van to 
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the dealership, with the keys, and explained to the manager that he was returning the van, as it 
was defective, and he could not transport passengers in it.(T.R. p. 42). 
At the same time he sent certified letters to the dealership, the manufacturer and Chrysler 
Credit. In the letter he explained the reason for his action, that is, that the van was defective and 
was not repaired.(T.R. p. 40). Return receipts were introduced (Exhibits 20 and 21) which Mr. 
Niculescu testified were receipts from some, but not all of the letters he wrote.(T,R. p. 43, 44). 
The receipts were dated as being sent March 31, 1987, some two weeks before the first payment 
was due on the vehicle. Mr. Niculescu testified as to the content of the letters. He stated that he 
informed the recipients of the letters that he was returning the vehicle because of the problems 
with the engine oil leaking and the defective and dangerous sliding door.(T. R. p. 43). He testified 
that he received no response to any of his letters, or the phone calls he made during the same 
period of time.(T.R. p. 45). 
In the summer of 1987 Mr. Niculescu attempted to purchase another vehicle on credit. 
(T.R. p. 49). His application was denied because of a negative credit entry, that is, the credit 
history showed that the transaction concerning the purchase and return of the van had been 
reported by Chrysler Credit as a repossession, the most damaging credit code other than perhaps 
a charge-off. (T.R. 266). Appellant submitted several documents (Exhibits 24, 25, 26 and 27) 
dated variously between July and December of 1987, showing instances of denied applications for 
credit, both for the purchase of vehicles, and other credit matters. (T.R. p. 55-58). 
Mr. Niculescu testified that as a result of the actions of the respondent, and the subsequent 
damage to his credit, he was unable to borrow money at a reasonable market rate, if at all, 
sometimes paying as much as 525% interest. (T.R. p. 60). He indicated that his financial situation 
snowballed, in that he could not afford to pay the exorbitant rates, further decreasing his available 
income, causing him to have to live in his car, and finally, to declare bankruptcy in 1992.(T.R. p. 
61; p. 129). 
The year 1992 was also the year that the appellant finally worked out a settlement with the 
respondent. After resisting the lawsuit for three years, they agreed, by written stipulation, to pay 
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the appellant $1,500 and agreed to delete the reference to the repossession and to inform credit 
agencies of the terms of the settlement. (See Exhibit 30). The salient paragraph reads: 
"Chrysler Credit Corporation shall issue to the appropriate credit reporting bureau 
an explanation detailing the complete satisfaction and settlement of its outstanding 
credit report relative to the agreeing Niculescu, including , if possible, a retraction 
of the repossession notice. Said explanation shall e in conformity with the rules and 
regulations of the credit bureau." 
But the respondents never complied with the settlement agreement. Not only did the 
appellant have to repeatedly request proof of compliance, but when some attempt to show 
compliance was made, it did not comply with the written agreement that the respondent signed. 
(T.R. p. 66, 64, Exhibit 32). In fact, Judge Cornaby so found. In the partial transcript that was 
prepared, only covering the court's ruling, at page 3, the court finds, with respect to the 
compliance, "I don't believe that filled the requirements of that paragraph. I think that it should 
have been more than that, and it should have been done immediately. When I say immediately, 
about 30 days, something like that, to give the parties a chance to get notified and do what they 
are supposed to do." 
The appellant filed a motion to reopen the case, alleging that the respondent had no 
complied with the agreement. The respondent did not respond to the motion and Judge Stirba 
granted the motion. Further discovery proceeded, with the respondent repeatedly being late or 
deficient in their responses. (See Exhibit, Addendum). When the appellant requested production 
of documents, the respondent indicated that it had destroyed the file sometime after 1992, 
thinking the matter had been resolved, even though the appellant, during the same period of time, 
was requesting proof of compliance from respondent's counsel, as stated earlier. Chrysler Credit's 
representative confirmed the destruction of the documents. (T.R. p. 179). 
Several acquaintances of Mr. Niculescu were called and testified as to their observations 
of his financial and living conditions during the time after the report of repossession was made. 
John Rhoades testified that he knew Mr. Niculescu as a cab driver, as he, Rhoades was a shuttle 
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driver for the airport. (T.R. p. 135). Mr. Rhoades testified about the long hours he knew Mr. 
Niculescu to work, and the financial realities of the cab business, the advantage of owning your 
own vehicle, and the lucrative ski resort business.(T.R. p. 138-139). Mr. Florin Preda, another cab 
driver who knows Mr. Niculescu, testified similarly, as well as testifying as to Mr. Niculescu's 
change in financial and personal circumstances during the relevant time period. He testified that 
Mr. Niculescu was then living as "a bum" and was actually living in his car.(T.R. p. 147). He was 
also able to compare Mr. Niculescu's status before and after the summer of 1987. (T.R. 153). 
Appellant also called Mr. Jon Cassel from Chrysler Credit Corporation. In 1987 Mr. 
Cassel was a customer accounts manager in the Bountiful, Utah office.(T.R. p. 156). He testified 
that the dealership's employees would prepare credit applications and submit them to Chrysler 
Credit.(T.R. p. 158). After testifying generally about credit reporting, he testified about his 
knowledge of Mr. Niculescu's case. After noting that a repossession was coded as "I 8" by credit 
bureaus (T.R. p. 161), he explained that after the first payment was not made on April, 25, 1987, 
a late notice would have gone out on approximately the 5th of May.(T.R. p. 163). He testified 
that the vehicle apparently sat at the dealership from April 1st until approximately May 19th when 
Chrysler Credit took possession of it.(T.R. p. 165). He testified that, other than bankruptcy, a 
repossession was the worst entry that could be made on someone's credit history (T.R. p. 172), 
and that such a notation affects someone's rating for seven years (T.R. p. 178). 
Mr. Cassel also testified that normally it would take 30 to 60 days to correct the credit 
history, as the settlement agreement required (T.R. p. 181) and yet he was aware that there was a 
dispute regarding compliance in 1993, that he was working closely with Gary Howell (sic) on the 
matter, and that no record of any attempt to correct the record was apparent until November of 
'93.(T. R. p. 184). Mr. Cassel testified as to other instances of Mr. Niculescu's credit history, and 
reported on credit purchases he made in later years. (T.R. p. 203). He also admitted that there 
was another way of coding a transaction as a return of purchase (T.R. p. 217-218, commenting on 
Trial Exhibit 10) rather than a repossession, contrary to his earlier testimony that there was no 
other way to report Mr. Niculescu's return of the vehicle. 
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After initially, in discovery, denying that the respondent had any knowledge of 
investigations or findings of fraud regarding Chrysler Motor Corporation's selling used vehicles as 
new, Mr. Cassel admitted knowledge of such issues. (T.R. p. 237-238). When appellant's counsel 
attempted to delve into this issue, the court would not allow it. (T.R. 239). Counsel proffered the 
relevance and further proffer is contained in the Addendum. (See Exhibit C). 
Arlene Bettingfield testified for the respondent. She testified that she worked in the 
Bountiful office of the respondent during the relevant time period. She testified in general about 
the workings of the office, having no personal knowledge of Mr. Niculescu's case. She admitted 
that there was a procedure to correct a credit report within her officer and she had done so on 
occasion. (T.R. p. 261). 
ARGUMENT 
THE DISMISSAL OF APPELLANT'S CAUSES OF ACTION BASED 
UPON NEGLIGENT DAMAGE TO APPELLANT'S CREDIT WAS 
IMPROPER. 
The appellant in this matter claimed a violation of 15 U.S.C. Section 1681. Admittedly, at 
the time of the filing of the complaint, a violation had to be grounded on a false report that was 
intentional and malicious. However, at the time of the ruling on the motion, the law had been 
amended to allow claims for negligence. Since the Appellant's motion to reopen the case was 
granted, and the Appellant's claims were of an ongoing nature, alleging that the respondent was 
continuing to erroneously report, and failing to correct his credit history, he should have been 
allowed the benefit of the new standard, at least as far as the damages occurring after the effective 
date of the amendment. 
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THE COURT SHOULD HAVE IMPOSED SANCTIONS FOR FAILURE 
TO RESPOND TO DISCOVERY AND SHOULD HAVE DEEMED 
ADMITTED THE REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS, 
The history of this case is replete with the inability or refusal of the respondent to comply 
with discovery in a timely manner. At least three motions to compel were filed by the appellant 
between 1989 and 1992 when the aborted settlement was reached. On two occasions the late 
discovery consisted of requests for admissions. One set, served on respondent on May 28, 1999, 
was not answered within 30 days, indeed, it was not answered until October 8, 1999, only after a 
motion to compel was granted, specifically warning the respondent that failure would result in 
serious sanctions, such as the striking of its pleadings. 
Another set, served on January 27th, 2000, was not responded to until at least February 
28th, some 32 days later, and at best the answers were incomplete or wholly deficient. The 
appellant filed a motion for sanctions dated the 28th day of March, 2000. The court erred in 
failing to grant the motion and to declare the admissions deemed admitted. 
It is clear that requests for admissions are automatically deemed admitted if they are not 
responded to in the 30 days required by Rule 36(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. An 
equivocal refusal to submit, even if timely filed, can be an admission Bair v. Axiom Design, 2001 
UT 20, 20 P.3d 388, (Utah 2001). As far back as 1979, in Schmitt v. Billings, 600 P.2d 516 (Utah 
1979) or in Whitaker v. Nikols, 699 P.2d 685 ( Utah 1985) this principle has been clear. And our 
courts have recently reiterated this interpretation of the rule. In the case of In The Matter of 
Pendleton, 2000 UT Adv. Rpt. 77, the Supreme Court stated: [W]e next address whether the 
matters set forth in the OPCs request for admissions were properly deemed admitted. The 
disciplinary court deemed the matters admitted because Pendleton failed to file a timely response 
to the OPCs request for admissions. Rule 36 makes clear that "[e]ach matter of which an 
admission is requested . . . is admitted" if not responded to within thirty days, Utah R. Civ. P. 
36(a)(2); see also Triple I Supply, Inc. v. Sunset Rail Inc., , 1299-1300 (Utah 1982). In the 
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instant case, Pendleton failed to timely respond to the OPC's request for admissions. Thus, the 
trial court correctly concluded that the matters set forth in the OPCs request were deemed 
admitted. 
The court has no discretion in this interpretation. This court reviews the matter for 
correctness. "We are asked to decide whether the trial court misapplied Rule 36(a) in deeming the 
requests admitted. The proper interpretation of a rule of procedure is a question of law, and we 
review the trial court's decision for correctness." Ostler v. Buhler, 1999 UT Adv. Rpt. 99, 5. 
Likewise, and in accord is State, In The Interest ofE.R., 2000 UTAPP 143. "Each matter 
of which an admission is requested shall be separately set forth. The matter is admitted unless, 
within thirty days after service of the request, or within such shorter or longer time as the court 
may allow, the party to whom the request is directed serves upon the party requesting the 
admission a written answer or objection addressed to the matter[.]Utah R- Civ- p- 3 6 ( a ) 0 ) & (2) 
(emphasis added). The rule does not say the court may admit the matter - it says "[t]he matter is 
admitted." Utah R. Civ. P. 36(a)(2) (emphasis added). By simple operation of Rule 36(a), parties 
who ignore requests for admissions do so at their peril. 
When requests for admissions are properly served, and no written answer or objection has been 
submitted, the result is automatic - the requests for admissions, as a matter of law, are deemed 
admitted by simple operation of the rule. See Jensen v. Pioneer Dodge Ctr., Inc., , 100-01 (Utah 
1985); United States v. 2204 Barbara Lane, , 129 (11th Cir. 1992); Hughes v. Bobich, , 755 
(Alaska 1994); W.H. Shipman, Ltd. v. Hawaiian Holiday Macadamia Nut Co., , 1209 (Haw. Ct. 
App. 1990); Peters, 709 N.E.2d at 54. See also 4A Moore's Federal Practice 36.05[4] n. 6 (2d 
ed. 1985) (discussing federal rule). 11. Rule 36 provides, in pertinent part, as follows: A party 
may serve upon any other party a written request for the admission, for purpose of the pending 
action only, of the truth of any matters . . . that relate to statements or opinions of fact or of the 
application of law to fact. 
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In this case it is clear that the admissions were properly served. It is also clear that the 
respondent at no time requested relief from the admissions. In Langeland v. Monarch Motors, 
952 P. 2d 1058 ( Utah 1998) the court again stated that the only real issue was the preliminary 
conditions stated in the rule: "Our decisions interpreting the rule have used similar language, 
conditioning the trial court's discretion on the satisfaction of the rule's preliminary conditions: 
Utah R. Civ. P. 36(b) provides that those matters deemed admitted are conclusively established as 
true unless the trial court, on motion by the defendant, permits withdrawal or amendment of the 
admissions. The trial court has the discretion to permit withdrawal or amendment of admissions 
when the presentation of the merits of the action would be served and the party obtaining the 
admissions fails to satisfy the court that he will be prejudiced in maintaining his action. The trial 
court does not have discretion to unilaterally disregard the admissions. (Emphasis in the 
original). 
The sanctions should have been imposed in this matter. The admissions should have been 
deemed admitted. The substance of the matters covered in the admissions would have 
conclusively established liability on the part of the respondent, as they required the respondent to 
admit that they had not independently verified the information about the loan, admit that they 
received written notification, which they disputed at trial, admit that they did not report the report 
as disputed, admit that they took no action to correct the credit history of the respondent or to 
comply with the settlement agreement, admit that they took no action with respect to the credit 
history of the appellant after notice and after being served with the lawsuit, and to admit that 
demand had been made upon them to show proof of compliance with the agreement. Such facts, 
which were disputed at trial, were material facts that, if deemed admitted, would have 
conclusively established many, if not all of the facts necessary for the appellant to prevail. The 
court clearly erred in denying the motion for sanctions. 
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THE APPELLANT PROVED BY A PREPONDERANCE OF THE 
EVIDENCE THAT THE RESPONDENT' ACTION'S WERE INTENTIONAL AND 
MALICIOUS 
The Appellant established that the actions of the respondent were intentional and 
malicious under the statute. Specifically, the appellant established that the report was false. The 
evidence was largely undisputed that Mr. Niculescu experienced serious problems with the 
vehicle, including, but not limited to, a major oil leak and several problems with proper closure of 
the sliding side door. He filed a federal lawsuit in 1987 alleging breach of warranty that was 
settled out of court. 
He returned the vehicle on April 1, 1987. The first payment was not due until April 25th. 
Mr. Niculescu was making money with the van. Certainly enough money to make the payments 
and still make a profit. Other than the problems, there was no indication that he was otherwise 
dissatisfied with his choice or purchase. And he had just been found to be creditworthy some 
three weeks earlier. 
It is also apparent that he notified all of the parties as to his reasons for his actions, this 
putting the respondent on notice that this was not a repossession case, but a product return or 
dispute based upon a warranty problem. He introduced certified mail receipts showing the notices 
and testified about other letters and phone contacts. And although the respondent's witnesses 
largely denied any knowledge of these contacts, it must be recalled that the parties were trying to 
reconstruct the activities of something that happened almost fourteen years in the past, the delay 
being largely a fault of the respondent's failure to comply with the settlement agreement entered 
into in 1992 and their dilatory tactics in responding to discovery. 
Likewise, it is clear that their lack of recollection or ability to recall events had much to do 
with the fact that they had admittedly destroyed and purged the file, supposedly in the belief that 
the case had been closed, even though Mr. Cassel testified that he had been in close contact with 
Chrysler's counsel and knew that there was a dispute as to whether the respondent had complied 
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with the settlement. Indeed, most of the documents admitted as exhibits in the trial were 
documents obtained and maintained by the appellant. 
There was evidence that there were other ways to report this transaction under the facts 
known to the respondents. See Exhibit 10, and the testimony of Arlene Bettingfield cited above. 
The court must look to the entire set of facts and circumstances in analyzing whether the actions 
were intentional and malicious. In Promax Development Corp. v. Mattson, 943 P.2d 347, (Utah 
App. 1997) the Court of Appeals stated: "Whether a person has acted with malice is a question of 
fact. See West v. Thomson Newspapers, , 187-88 (Utah.Ct.App. 1992) (noting that judgment as 
matter of law inappropriate where jury could find as matter of fact that people acted with malice), 
vacated on other grounds, (Utah 1994). It follows that the degree of malicious behavior is also a 
question of fact, reviewable for clear error." 
In this case besides the facts noted above, there are numerous other matters relevant and 
probative of the attitude, and therefore the malice of the respondent. The respondent did not 
respond to any of the letters of Mr. Niculescu, which were sent on the 15th, 24th and 31st of 
March of 1987. While the respondent faults the appellant and attempts to avoid responsibility for 
the false and misleading report by pointing out that he could have contacted the credit agencies 
directly and disputed the entry, nothing indicates that they informed him of this right, or even that 
they stood by their report. They simply ignored him. 
While they claim that there was no other way to report the transaction, they admit that 
there are ways to list matters as a "product return." They admit that they have, on occasion, 
amended or changed credit entries. They knew this was not a simple repossession or credit 
relevant problem, but a dispute over a warranty with the manufacturer, their parent company. 
They clearly had knowledge when the lawsuit was filed, yet they did nothing to correct the 
problem. In fact, they did everything they could to thwart the efforts of Mr. Niculescu to obtain 
relief. They delayed and obstructed discovery. They destroyed relevant documents, in spite of 
their knowledge of the ongoing dispute. 
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After three years, they entered into a settlement, which the trial court found, was never 
complied with. The only evidence submitted of an attempt to comply with the salient points of the 
agreement was a copy of a "bullseye" allegedly sent to someone in November 1993, some fifteen 
months after the agreement was signed. This, in spite of the complaints and requests of the 
appellant. This is what the trial court found totally insufficient compliance with the agreement. 
They continued to obstruct and delay discovery, requiring yet more motions to compel to 
gain compliance and yet providing incomplete responses. All of these facts are relevant in 
interpreting whether the respondent acted with malice, as defined by the statute. And all of these 
facts were established, proving malice by a preponderance of the evidence. In fact, the 
respondent, being in the business, should be charged with the knowledge of the damage that 
surely followed their actions. 
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING THE MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM THE 
JUDGMENT AND THE OBJECTIONS TO THE ORDER 
After the decision the respondent filed a proposed order. The appellant filed objections to 
the order with specific findings as to suggested changes and additions to the order. The objections 
were filed two days before the court signed the order. The appellant filed a motion for relief from 
the judgment as signed. The court, while stating that the objections were untimely, proceeded to 
rule on the merits of the objections and rejected any additions proposed by the appellant. By 
doing so the court ignored inconsistencies between the decision, as announced from the bench, 
and the final order. Specifically, the court, among other things, refused to include the court's 
announced finding that the respondent had not ever complied with the settlement agreement, 
finding that the attempt to do so, some fifteen months later, was ineffective in any event. The 
court further made a finding that the appellant had surely suffered damages as a result of the 
failure of the respondent to live up to its agreement, and yet the court, while having ample 
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evidence in the record to do so, refused to award damages for the failure of the respondent to 
comply. 
The court seemed to take the position that, since the appellant had opted to re-open the 
case, he could not be awarded damages for the violation of the settlement agreement. But at the 
very least, he proved to the satisfaction of the judge, that there were damages from August of 
1992 on. Numerous examples in the testimony, as cited in the recitation of facts above, show that 
the appellant was continuing to suffer the after effects of the original report after the respondent 
had agreed to correct the report and delete the reference to the transaction. The respondent's own 
witnesses testified that the effect of a report of repossession lasted for seven years. And although 
there was testimony of the filing of bankruptcy, the evidence was that the bankruptcy itself was a 
product of the snowballing effect of the original report of repossession. Where the court orally 
announced such findings, the court should have included such findings in its order and should 
have at least awarded damages for the time between 1992 and the present which were shown to 
be caused by the failure to correct the credit history, as agreed. To do otherwise was to, in effect, 
allow the respondent to profit by its misdeed, suffering no consequences for their failure to 
comply with the agreement and causing the appellant to undertake the difficult task of trying to 
reconstruct the evidence of the case some fourteen years after the fact. Such difficulty was 
apparent from the trial and fact that documents that would have been discoverable were 
"destroyed" by the respondent. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Niculescu came to this country to start a better life for himself and his family. He 
worked hard a menial jobs. He established his credit and had purchased several items, including 
but not limited to, automobiles on credit. He had faithfully paid these items off in a timely manner. 
He had an idea to improve his lot and bought a van to avail himself of additional income he could 
produce with the van. When he could not get the dealership or the manufacturer to abide by their 
warranty, he returned the vehicle, and in his mind, acted reasonably to inform the necessary 
parties of the reasons for his actions. He informed the respondent that he would not pay for the 
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vehicle because it was defective, and that the respondent could not expect him to pay for the 
vehicle which was defective. Had they informed him that they expected to be paid irregardless, at 
least he could have protected himself. Instead, he was ignored and his case was treated the same 
as if he was unable to pay, rather than as it should have been, as a returned, defective product. He 
believed that the respondent could not finance the sale of a defective product once they were 
notified of the problem. 
He had the right to expect that they would at least respond to his letters and phone calls, 
some of which were documented, some which were not. If in his naivete, he did not know exactly 
what actions he should take, he believed that he would at least get a response. He got none. He 
was ignored. 
A report was made to all of the major credit agencies listing the matter as a repossession, 
one of the most serious negative credit references that could be made. As unusual as the 
circumstances were, the van left sitting for over a month and a half at the dealership, the van being 
returned well before the first payment was due, and still no contact was made by the respondents 
to enquire as to the problem. No response was made to the certified letters that were received. 
Other options were available, yet none were used. 
Instead the respondent resisted the lawsuit that was eventually filed. Not by vigorously 
defending it, but by obstruction and delay. Still no eflFort was made to correct the problem. 
Meanwhile, the damage to Mr. Niculescu continued. His once perfect credit was gone. He was 
forced to sleep in his car and pay loan shark interest rates to survive, eventually resulting in his 
filing bankruptcy. 
Finally, five years after the fact, the respondent agreed to delete the reference to the 
repossession from his credit history. And the respondent failed to comply. The suit was 
re-opened. Again, the respondent obstructed and delayed. Sanctions were threatened but not 
enforced. The court failed to enforce the automatic provisions of the rules. Again, the respondent 
was allowed to benefit from its own failures. Documents were destroyed while the respondent 
well knew that there was a dispute about the settlement. 
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The trial judge, who was admittedly new to the case and had not had a chance to fully 
review the file, failed to follow the law and award damages that were admittedly proven. The trial 
judge erroneously ruled that since the appellant had chosen to re-open the entire case, rather than 
sue for breach of the settlement agreement, he could not award damages for the breach as well, 
even though he found there had been a breach of the agreement. He erroneously thought that 
there was an issue in this trial regarding the breach of warranty. 
At trial the appellant admitted clear and sometimes undisputed evidence of his damages, 
from the approximately sixteen hundred dollars a month that he lost in income, the extra expenses 
and loss of earnings he had because he had to lease a vehicle rather than own one, to the 
extraordinary interest rates he was forced to pay as a direct result of his poor credit rating. The 
court had ample evidence to award specific damages and yet failed to make such an award. And 
the final order failed to include findings that were made and announced by the court. The 
judgment should be overturned, and either damages ordered based upon the record, or the 
appellant should be granted a new trial where the admissions submitted are deemed admitted with 
the trial conducted consistent with this court's order. 
DATED this day of , 2001. 
MARK A. BESENDORFER 
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PROOF OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I hand delivered a copy of the foregoing Appellant's Brief to the Utah 
Attorney General's Office this day of 2000. 







In consideration for the payment of One Thousand Five 
Hundred and no/100 Dollars ($1,500.00) payable to Adrian 
Niculescu receipt of which is acknowledged by Adrian^^culescu 
(hereinafter the "Undersigned"), the Undersigned hereby 
releases and forever discharges Hinckley Dodge, a Utah 
corporation, Chrysler Motor Corporation and Chrysler Credit 
Corporation, their agents, principals, servants, employees, 
affiliates, predecessors in interest, successors in interest, 
subsidiaries and parent corporations (collectively referred to 
as the "Released Parties") from any and all claims, losses, 
demands, damages, actions, causes of actions or suits, of 
whatever kind or nature which now exist or which may hereafter 
accrue because of, for, arising out of or in any way connected 
with the subject or causes of action set forth in the files and 
records of the Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, in that certain action denominated 
Adrian Niculescu, Plaintiff v» Hinckley Dodge, a Utah 
corporation. Chrysler Motor Corporation and Chrysler Credit 
Corporation. defendantsr Civil No. 890906110CV. 
This is a general and complete release of all claims 
against the Released Partes and includes, but is not limited to 
claims for personal injuries, property damages, claims for loss 
of income, contribution, breach of contract, emotional 
distress, indemnity, attorneys fees, permanent injury, cost of 
litigation, loss of status, loss of credit rating, and all 
other claims of any kind whatsoever. It is also the express 
intent of the Undersigned to this General Release to relieve 
the Released Parties of any and all liability for indemnity 
contribution of attorneys fees arising from or pertaining to 
the legal action described above. It is further understood and 
agreed that this settlement is the compromise of a doubtful and 
disputed claim and that payment is not to be construed as an 
admission of liability on the part of the released parties by 
whom liability is expressly denied. The Undersigned represents 
and warrants that in entering into this release that he has had 
the opportunity for independent legal advice and is not relying 
upon any claims, representations or advices from any 
representative of any party hereby released. 
Chrysler Credit Corporation shall issue to the appropriate 
credit reporting bureau an explanation detailing the complete 
satisfaction and settlement of its outstanding credit report 
relative to Adrian Niculescu including, if possible, a 




be in conformity with the rules and regulations of the credit 
bureau. 
0 Dated: August i!r 1992. 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
Adrian Niculescu '^h- -L V ° ° ^r^X^d 
) ss. 
) 
c/*-The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this/^ 
day of August, 1992, by Adrian Niculescu. 




800 Kennecott Building 
Salt lake City, Utah 84133 
My Commission Expires 
February 3,1994 




IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 




HINCKLEY DODGE, a Utah 
corporation; and CHRYSLER MOTOR 




Case No. 890906110CV 
Honorable ANNE M. STIRBA 
Court Clerk: Marcy Thorne 
The above-entitled matter comes before the Court pursuant to 
plaintiff's "Motion for Relief," filed on April 24, 2001. On May 
4, 2001, defendant filed "Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to 
Plaintiff's ^Motion for Relief.'" No reply has been filed and the 
matter was submitted for decision on May 15, 2001. 
After reviewing the record in this matter, the Court finds 
plaintiff's motion is not well taken. Specifically, paintiff fails 
to cite any grounds under Rule 60(b) on which he relies. 
Furthermore, the Court considered plaintiff's "Objections to 
Proposed findings and Conclusions," although not timely submitted 
pursuant to Rule 4-504(2), and found them to be without merit. 
Accordingly, the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in the form 
proposed by defendant (after having made the edits requested by the 
Court) were entered. 
Based upon the forgoing, plaintiff's Motion for Relief is 
denied. , This Minute Entry constitutes the Order regarding the 
matters addressed herein. No further order is required. 
DATED this^22r^^y of MaY' 2001. 
BY THE COURT 
mm M. STTRB. 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
e^LukeJ^ 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
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following people for case 890906110 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
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Dated thi day of £L 20 y-
























UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
EASTERN DISTRICT OP MISSOURI 
EASTERN DIVISION OF MISSOURI 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
Plaintiff* 
V8 
CHRYSLER MOTOR CORPORATION, 
PRANK J. O'RBILLEY 
and ALLEN P. SCUDDER, 
Defendants. 
No. 87-165 Cr (1) 
St. Louis, Missouri 
December 14, 1987 
TRANSCRIPT OP PLEA OP NOLO CONTENDERE 
ON BEHALF OP CHRYSLER MOTOR CORPORATION 
BEFORE THE HONORABLE JOHN P. MANGLE 
APPEARANCES} 
Por the Governmenti 
For the Defendant, 
Chrysler Motor Corporation! 
Also Present! 
Por Defendant 
Prank J. O'Reilly! 
Por Defendant 
Allen P. Scudder 
Thomas E. Dittmeier, Esq. 
United States Attorney 
BY JAMES STEITZ, Esq. 
and JAMES MARTIN, Esq. 
1114 Market Street 
St. Louis, Missouri 
Thompson 6 Mitchell 
By Charles A* Newman, Esq. 
One Mercantile Center 
St. Louis, Missouri 63101 
Obermaier, Morvillo, Abramowitz 
& Iason, P.C. 
By Barry A. Bohrer, Esq. 
1120 Avenue of the Americas 
New York, New York 10036 
Lewis 6 Rice 
By Barry Short, Esq. 
611 Olive Street 
St. Louis, Missouri 63101 
Armstrong Teasdale Kramer & 
Vaughn 
•tfSr 
1 I By Fred Mayer, Esq. 
611 Olive Street 


















20 | Eileen R. Groh, Official Court Reporter 
1114 Market Street, St. Louis, Missouri 63101 































THE COURT: United States vs Chrysler. Mr. James 
Steitz is here for the government. 
MR. STEITZt Yes, along with Mr. Martin* 
THE COURTi Mr. James Martin. Mr. Ankney is here with 
someone. Okay. Nov, Mr. Newman, did you have an announcement fop 
thi3 court? 
MR. NEWMANi We do, your Honor. Our client, Chrysler 
Motors Corporation, would like to withdraw its previously 
entered plea of not guilty to the counts to the indictment and 
enter a plea of nolo contendre or no contest. 
THE COURT: Okay, Mr. Newman. Mr. Steitz, did you havjs 
an announcement for this court? 
MR. STEITZ: Judge, traditionally, and as a matter of 
policy, the government has always opposed such pleas of nolo 
contendre and we will do so on this occasion. However, the 
government sees and realizes that this is a unique case before 
the court and that similar pleas have been accepted in consumer 
type cases. However, and nevertheless, the government will, 
pursuant to our policy, oppose this plea. 
THE COURT: Okay. I forgot to call upon two of the mos 
prominent members of this bar, probably since its inception. 
Mr. Short, you don't want to be recognized, and Mr. Mayer is 
appearing for respective clients. 
MR. SHORT: I will rise in that fashion. 



























MR. SHORT: Prank O'Reilly. 
THE COURTj And Mr. Scudder by Mr. Mayer. Okay. Mr. 
Newman, do you have some, a statement to sake with regard to 
your presentation of this plea, sir? 
MR. NEWMANi We do, your Honor. On behalf of our 
client, Chrysler, we will urge that the Court accept this plea 
for four reasons. First, by the acceptance of this plea. It irUJL 
resolve the question of restitution, that i», compensation^ o 
those who have been affooted by Chrysler's conduct as quickly aji 
possible. The second reason we would urge the court accept the 
plea is that the practice of disconnecting the odometers during 
this quality test drive ceased at all plants in October of 1986 
and currently Chrysler continues to operate the program but witji 
connected odometers on all vehicles. 
THE COURT: What was the date of the indictment? 
MR. NEWMAN: The indictment was June 24, your Honor. 
THE COURT: '87? 
MR. NEWMAN: Correct. 
THE COURT: Go ahead, Mr. Newman. 
MR. NEWMAN: The third reason is that specially to the 
benefit of both the Court and the government, and also our own 
client, that a very lengthy and expensive trial would be time 
consuming, would be void; and, lastly, the Court has been made 
aware and indeed the chairman of the Board of Chrysler Mr. 
Iacooca, in fact, announced four steps for a program to aid the 
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consumers who received these vehicles which included increased 
warranty coverage from five years, 50 thousand miles to 7 years\ 
70 thousand miles, to also extending that coverage not only in 
time but to include certain major types of those vehicles that 
would not be otherwise covered and also these consumers were 
offered a free inspection and repair, if they brought their 
vehicles in. And then, lastly, as to the very few vehicles, we 
estimate there were approximately 40 that were damaged in the 
course of this program over a substantial period. 
The owners of those vehicles have been offered a 
comparable, brand new, 1988 Chrysler, no questions asked. So 
for those four points, your Honor, we would ask that the court 
accept the plea of nolo contendre which is going to be offered 
by the company this morning. 
THE COURT* Well, I should mention that Mr Steitz 
mentioned the tradition of this U.S. Attorney1s Office and that 
is, of course, in this district, I suspect, like most federal 
districts across the country, and this judge, like most federal 
judges, have accepted nolo pleas only under extraordinary 
circumstances, and just for the record here, so that it's 
perfectly clear, I want to mention that the possibility of this 
plea in this case as first broached in the discussion with all 
of the attorneys who are present, some, and attorneys for all of 
parties some weeks ago, and I think that first time I advised 



























would consider such a plea, and this Information would include, 
did include, first, a review by the lawyers in my presence of 
their view in the case and of their positions in the case and 
the anticipated evidence on the key factual cases in dispute, 
because, frankly, there are not a lot of questions in dispute. 
I guess, the real thrust is the question of intent. 
There doesn't seem to be much dispute about what happened but i| 
any event I had an opportunity to go over those things and get 
them from the lawyers and also to review the documents and 
summaries which aided me in ay decision concerning this nolo 
plea. So the pros and cons of that, this plea and in this case 
have been thoroughly reviewed by me. I've studied the material 
that was furnished and I've given a lot of consideration to thi 
entire matter, and I'm well satisfied that a nolo contendre pie} 
is appropriate in this case. 
There are really very few differences between the 
effect of a guilty plea than of a nolo plea. In this case the 
primary ones relate to the effect that the plea will have on an} 
civil litigation which might arise from these circumstances, 
same circumstances an in this case. As the lawyers know, of 
course, I have the authority to order fines and restitution, bu 
even more importantly, I will advise that I will preside over 
the various aspects of the related federal court class action 
suits that are scattered across the country, and I don't take 




























going to be a heavy burden because everybody knows that we're 
under some pressure with the loss of two, recent loss of two 
senior judges, and Judge Meredith whose not been working in 
recent months, but truthfully will be soon. 
But, anyway, we're pretty well inundated. I do feel 
in order to properly assure as fair a disposition as is possibl^ 
for claims for damages that have been suffered by the class 
action, plaintiffs and consumers, that I will have to preside 
over those cases. 
So I agree with you, Mr. Newman, it would be a 
totally unnecessary expenditure of moneys and time to take up 
the parties in this court in any protracted litigation, where a 
nolo plea gives me the same punishment alternatives as I'd have 
had Chrysler been found guilty after a protracted trial and alsj} 
possibly protracted appellate procedures. So with the 
permission of Mr. Steitz and Mr. Newman, and if you have nothing 
else to say I'm going to proceed to ask the parties to respond 
to certain questions that I deem to be pertinent here. Mr. 
Steitz, did you have anything further at this point? 
MR. STEITZ: No, your Honor. 
THE COURTt Or Mr.Newman? 
MR. NEWMANt No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: So, Mr.Newman, it's my understanding that 
the defendant pleads nolo contendre to each of the counts in 



























A. That18 correct, your Honor• 
THE COURTi And did you bring with you a representative 
of the company to answer questions that I night have In this 
regard? 
MR. NEWMAN! I did, your Honor. If I nay Identify I'd 
introduce to the Court, Mr. Leroy Richie, who is vice-president 
and general counsel of Chrysler Motors Corporation and who has 
been authorized by duly enacted resolution of the company to 
respond to the Court's inquiry. 
THE COURT: Good morning, Mr. Richie. Would you step 
over to Mr. Rainey and be sworn, please. 
LEROY C. RICHIE, SWORNi 
QUESTIONS BY THE COURT* 
Q. Mr. Richie, you can stand right there. I'm not going to 
make a witness out of you in that regard. And you've been 
identified as the general counsel for Chrysler, that's correct, 
is it? 
A. That is correct. I'm a vice-president of the company. 
Q. And on the Board of Directors of the defendant. You're a 
lawyer? 
A. I'm a lawyer. 
Q. Where did you go to school, Mr. Richie? 
A. New York City. 
Q. And would you represent to me that the Board of Directors 



























here to enter this plea? 
A. They have. 
Q. And did they do that by a resolution? 
A. They did. 
Q. Mr. Newman, you supplied — 
MR. STEITZt Your Honor, yes. I do have a copy of the 
resolution. 
THE COURTi And the paper Mr. Newman is handing to me 
signed by G. Lee Phillip is an appropriate resolution to this 
effect, is it? 
A. Yes it is. 
THE COURTt 1*11 order this be made a part of the 
record of this case, Mr. Raney. I don't think I'll insult the 
defendant with the form question that should be asked, namely 
whether you are financally able to pay a substanial fine, but I 
sense, Mr. Newman, that they would be. 
MR. NEWMAN: Correct, your Honor. 
THE COURTt Mr. Richie, and again, you've gone over 
these charges with Mr. Newman and your lawyers, I guess, a 
number of times? 
A. I have. 
THE COURTi May I assume you've gone over them with 
your Board of Directors? 
A. Yes I have. 




























A. Yes. I'm familiar with the charges . 
Q. Now, you know* then I will go through the litany, that you 
are entitled to counsel to represent you throughout? 
A, I know that. 
Q. You know, of course, that Chrysler has a right to plead 
guilty and to persist in this plea. You know, that? 
MR. NEWHANs Not guilty. 
Q. Plead not guilty. You've got the right to plead guilty, 
too. 
Q. You know, that you have those rights? 
A. Yes, I do. 
Q. Okay. And you know that you have the right to a speedy and 
public trial before a judge or jury? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And in that trial, that through the use of counsel, that 
you have a right of confrontation, that is, to look at the 
witnesses, to cross-examination the witnesses of the government 
and things of that sort, do you? 
A. Yes, I do. 
Q. Do you know that the government has the burden of proof to 
prove it's case beyond a reasonable doubt. Do you understand 
that? 
A. I understand that. 



























applies to this case and to all criminal oases and it would be 
applicable to presume that Chrysler is innocent in this case 
until the government carries it's burden of proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt by credible evidence to the satisfaction of thfe 
judge and jury trying the case? You're aware of that, are you? 
A* I am aware of that. 
Q. Of course^ as in any such criminal trial, Chrysler would 
not have to put on any testimony, any evidence, but could stand 
or sit and remain silent with regard to it's defense? 
A. I understand. 
Q. It has offered no evidence — any criminal defendant in a 
criminal case is not required to offer any evidence on his own 
or it's behalf? You're aware of that? 
A. I am aware of that. 
Q. Likewise, you have the right to subpoena witnesses who 
might testify on your behalf and I will order that they appear 
and testify, providing that they are available and that they 
will furnish information on the case? You know that? 
A. I know that, your Honor. 
Q. Have any threats or promises other than the fact that 
you're in this lawsuit, but any threats or promises of that 
nature, of a different nature, been made to get you to plead 
guilty or nolo contendre? 
A. Mo, they have not. 



























that a judgment of conviction will be entered upon that plea, d{> 
you? 
A. I understand that* 
Q. Do you believe there's any understanding or has any 
prediction been made concerning the sentence that I will order 
other than the explaining the fine that we're going to get intoj? 
A. No. 
Q. Okay. And you know that I do not have to accept your plea 
of nolo contendre unless I'm satisfied that you fully understand 
your rights? You realize that, Mr. Richie? 
A. I do realize that. 
Q. So with regard to the range of punishmentf fines, 
restitutionf special assessments, let me just mention some 
things and then I want, I donft want any speeches from you 
folks, but I want your response. This matter has been discussed 
in broad terms by the lawyers, you're aware of that? 
A. I am aware of that. 
Q. By the lawyers, I mean all of the lawyers for the 
defendants as well as me? You know that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Further you realize that no conclusion and no suggestion o 
any sort was made by me as to what fine, what type of order, 
restitution I might have? You realize that? 
A. I do realize that. 
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things that aren't totally clear with regards to the lav in thi£ 
regard. You understand that Mr. Richie? 
A. I do understand. 
Q. And in fact, I want to be — I think I'm safe in saying 
that the range of fines that were discussed as conceivably be into 
possible were from one million dollars up to $180 Billion. Ar£ 
you aware of that proposition? 
A. Yes, sir. Yes, your Honor. I'm aware of that. 
Q. By being, saying you're aware of it, ~ Mr. Steitz, you 
are, you're likewise aware of this discussion? 
A. Yes, your Honor. 
Q. Do you both understand what I'll say now, that before I 
will enter any fine in, and order such in this case, that I wiljL 
receive briefs on that question from the lawyers, and will act 
upon those briefs and that I will set such fine as I deem to be 
appropriate and proper under the applicable law. Is that 
acceptable to you, Mr. Richie? 
A. That is acceptable. 
Q. And Mr. Newman? 
MR. NBWMANs Correct, your Honor. 
Q. And Mr. Steitz? 
MR. STEITZt Yes, your Honor. 
Q. So that I am covering a, that, again it's, it arises out of 
the fact that the laws have been passed concerning fines and 


























would also say to the parties that should either of you with 
regard to the fine question not be satisfied or not be, ay fine 
to be appropriate or any of the punishment* you reserve your 
rights of appeal, both parties to do that? Yes? 
MR. NEWMANi Correct, your Honor? 
A. Yes. 
THE COURTt Mr. Steitz, would you just briefly outline 
the evidence that you will expect to adduce at this trial. 
MR. STEITZj Very briefly, your Honor, the government's 
proof would show at least between 1949 and by Chrysler's own 
admission, 1929 and October of 1986 Chrysler authorized it's 
management all over the country and Canada to drive newly 
manufactured Chrysler vehicles with disconnected odometers on 
trips both to and from work and on other personal trips and 
errands, that after these trips were made, the odometers would 
then be reconnected and sold to unaware consumers and dealers. 
In the event, the odometers on these vehicles were mistakenly 
left connected and registered mileage, and then Chrysler 
directed that these odometers be changed, proof would show tha|t 
the reason for these acts was to avoid complaints from dealers 
and consumers that they were purchasing vehicles with excessive 
registered mileage and, further, your Honor, the practice, this 
practice went on for many, many years and many, many cars were 
involved. We have not yet reached an impact number of 



























after a computer analysis by all of the parties involved, we 
feel that this number will be considerably higher* Further, tht 
evidence would show that we found that at least 44 of these cars 
were involved in accidents while being driven in this manner anp 
that the consumers in these situations were never apprized of 
this situation. 
Finally* your Honor, the evidence would show that the 
mailings and interstate wire transmissiona were used during the 
course of these. 
THE COURT: Now, you have basically tracked in a broad 
sense the indictment in this case, am I right? 
MR. STEITZt Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURTi The first count is the conspiracy count? 
MR. STEITZt Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: And the next, 16 in all, and the counts 2 
through 14 are wire and mail frauds? 
MR. STEITZt yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: And the last count? 
MR. STEITZ: 2 through 15 — 
THE COURT: 2 through 15, wire and mail, yes. Pardon 
me. Okay. 
QUESTIONS BY THE COURT: 
Q. And, again, you, Mr. Richie, you're aware that that's the 
charge, the summary of the charges in this case and the Board of 



























A. Yes, sir. 
Q. I didn't ask you, you also know, He. Richie, that I have 
the right to order restitution in this case? 
A. I am aware of that, your Honor. 
Q. Okay* Mr. Newman and Mr. Richie, do you still desire to 
plead nolo contendre for all of these counts on behalf of 
Chrysler at this time? 
MR. NEWMANt Yes, your Honor. 
A. Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT* Anything further, Mr. Steitz at this point 
or Mr. Newman at this point.? 
MR. STEIT2: No, sir • 
MR. NEWMANt No, your Honor. 
THE COURTJ All right. I'm going to find that the pie 
made by the defendant has been made voluntarily, that it has 
been made knowledgably. I will also find that Mr. Richie is th 
general counsel and vice-president of the defendant corporation 
and he'8 accordingly authorized by a valid resolution to enter 
this plea and the resolution has been made a part of the record 
and I'll furthers find that the Board of Directors of Chrysler 
was authorized to so direct Mr. Richie to enter such plea and 
further find that the defendant is financially able to pay any 
substantial fines and other charges and costs, that may be 
imposed by this Court. And, having given due consideration to 



























administration of it, I will accordingly enter a judgment of 
conviction on the plea of nolo contendre. Any further 
announcements by either of the parties before I — 
MR* STEITZi The government does in light 
of the action taken by the Court today and the plea by Chrysler 
the government would move to dismiss charges against Mr. Scuddej: 
and Mr. O'Reilly, that were filed in this matter. 
THE COURT: And, Mr. Short and Mr. Mayer, you have no 
objection. Mr. Scudder and Mr. O'Reilly are present in court. 
MR. SHORTi They are present, your Honor, and we, of 
course, have no objection. 
MR. MAYERs Yes, sir. 
THE COURTs Well, I think it's an appropriate motion 
under the circumstances and I will so order those dismissals. 
Gentlemen, I'll order a limited type of presentence report and, 
Mr. Newman, in due course check with Mr. Lorenz or whoever it ifc 
to handle that for me. I'm going to set a sentencing date next 
year, Pebruary the 19th. Is this a Friday, Earl? 
THE CLERKs Yes, it is a Friday. 
THE COURT* I'll set that date with the understanding 
that it well may be adjusted, depending upon the course of 
information I receive from you gentlemen, as well as the civil 
matters that are pending, and, if you would, let's see, what's 
today, December the 14th, within three weeks, why don't you 



























you don't need the others, and then I'll give you three or ao, 
three weeks from this day; you'll each file a brief with regard 
to the question of fines and restitution, which I don't think 
you need to touch upon too auch but that's up to you two and 
then I'll give you each another week thereafter to respond to 
the other party's filing and anything else at this time. 
MR. STEITZt Judge, just one question, would that be a 
brief just on the fine and restitution? It's wouldn't be a 
sentencing memorandum? 
THE COURT: No, just on the fine and restitution, jus 
on this legal question. 
MR. NEWMAN: We have nothing else. 
MR. STEITZ: That's all your Honor. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 




HINCKLEY DODGE, ez al 
Defendants. 
MINUTE ENTRY 
Case No. 890906110CV 
Honorable ANNE M. STIRBA 
Court Clerk: Marcy Thorne 
September 27, 1999 
The above-entitled matter comes before the Court pursuant 
LO Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration. 
Specifically, on August 31, 1999, plaintiff filed a "Motion to 
Compel" against Chrysler Credit Corporation, which was supported by 
an affidavit of plaintiff's counsel. Defendant Chrysler Credit 
Corporation did not oppose the motion. The motion was submitted 
for decision on September 20. There is no request for oral 
argument. 
The Court, having considered the motion, the supporting 
affidavit and the good cause that has been shown, hereby grants the 
morion to compel and orders defendant Chrysler Credit Corporation 
to respond to plaintiff's discovery requests on or before October 
8, 1999. Failure to comply with this order may result in an award 
of attorneys fees and costs or the answer of this defendant to be 
stricken and its default entered. 
This signed minute entry constitutes the order regarding the 
matters addressed herein. No further order is required. 
DATED this 27th day of September, 1999. 
BY THE COURT 
ANNE M. STIRBA 
THIRD DISTRICT JUDGE 
cc: Counsel/Pro Se Parties of Record 
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